Diamond v. Chakrabarty and the Recent Human-Hybrid patent application

In light of the Patent Office's decision, it is interesting to review some of the Supreme Court's language in the Diamond v. Chakrabarty case, where the Court held that a living organisms was patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101. While the Patent Office rejected the monkey-human hybrid combination as being "too human" (and in fact stated in 1987 that it would draw the line at humans), it set forth no legal basis for doing so. Remember, "anything under the sun made by man" can be patented.

In Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court stated that it was Congress's place to legislate on moral issues and the Court's place to establish whether or not an invention fulfilled the requirements of the Patent Act:

To buttress his argument, the petitioner, with the support of amicus, points to grave risks that may be generated by research endeavors such as respondent’s. The briefs present a gruesome parade of horribles.

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These arguments are forcefully, even passionately, presented; they remind us that, at times, human ingenuity seems unable to control fully the forces it creates — that with Hamlet, it is sometimes better “to bear those ills we have than fly to others that we know not of.”

It is argued that this Court should weigh these potential hazards in considering whether respondent’s invention is patentable subject matter under § 101. We disagree.

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What is more important is that we are without competence to entertain these arguments — either to brush them aside as fantasies generated by fear of the unknown, or to act on them. The choice we are urged to make is a matter of high policy for resolution within the legislative process after the kind of investigation, examination, and study that legislative bodies can provide and courts cannot. That process involves the balancing of competing values and interests, which in our democratic system is the business of elected representatives. Whatever their validity, the contentions now pressed on us should be addressed to the political branches of the Government, the Congress and the Executive, and not to the courts.

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Congress is free to amend § 101 so as to exclude from patent protection organisms produced by genetic engineering. …. Or it may chose to craft a statute specifically designed for such living things. But, until Congress takes such action, this Court must construe the language of § 101 as it is. The language of that section fairly embraces respondent’s invention.

In reading what the Supreme Court wrote twenty five years ago, it begs the question – what is different today? Shouldn't Congress be dealing with this, and not the USPTO? After all, if the monkey-human hybrid is useful, novel, and non-obvious, it meets the requirements for patentability as laid out by Congress. Is it really the USPTO's place to make moral judgments on what should be patentable subject matter?